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The optimal choice of a monetary policy instrument depends on how tight and transparent the available
instruments are and on whether policymakers can commit to future policies. Tightness is always desirable;
transparency is only if policymakers cannot commit. Interest rates, which can be made endogenously
tight, have a natural advantage over money growth and exchange rates, which cannot. As prices, interest
and exchange rates are more transparent than money growth. All else equal, the best instrument is
interest rates and the next-best, exchange rates. These findings are consistent with the observed instrument
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pkehoe@res.mpls.frb.fed.usWhat is the best instrument for conducting monetary policy–interest rates, exchange rates, or
money growth rates? The answer to this classic question depends heavily on two instrument
characteristics: tightness and transparency. One instrument is tighter than another if it is more
closely linked to the feature it is meant to inﬂuence–here, inﬂation. An instrument is more
transparent if it better reveals the actions of the government to the public. Using a standard
representative agent model, we argue that tightness is always desirable in an instrument and
that transparency is desirable only if the policymaker cannot commit to future policies.
This argument has clear implications for the optimal choice of a monetary policy in-
strument. The tightness of interest rates is endogenously determined, while that of the other
instruments is exogenous. Endogenous tightness allows policies to be structured so as to give
interest rates a natural advantage over both money growth and exchange rates in environments
with and without commitment. With regard to transparency, we follow the literature and ar-
gue that, because they are prices, interest rates and exchange rates are more transparent than
money growth. We show that this greater transparency gives interest and exchange rates a
natural advantage over money growth in an environment without commitment. Thus, in any
environment, interest rates have natural advantages over exchange rates and money growth,
while in some environments, exchange rates have natural advantages over money growth. Our
analysis implies that, all else equal, interest rates are the best monetary policy instrument and
exchange rates, the next-best instrument.
These ﬁndings oﬀer insights into observed policy choices across economies. Developed
economies have generally used the model’s preferred instrument, interest rates, as their primary
policy instrument. In less-developed economies, ﬁnancial markets tend to function poorly, so
interest rates are often not an instrument option. Instead of money growth, therefore, these
economies have tended to use the model’s next-best choice, exchange rates.
Our work here contributes directly to the literature on optimal monetary policy instru-
ments. The idea that tightness is desirable in an instrument dates at least to the classic analysis
of Poole [1970]. He shows that the desirability of interest rates as an instrument relative to
money growth rates depends only on the relative variability of exogenous shocks. His model
has no forward-looking features and thus has a unique equilibrium even under an interest rate
policy. Sargent and Wallace [1975] show that in models with forward-looking private agents,interest rate rules that depend only on the history of exogenous shocks lead to indeterminacy
of equilibria, but money rules lead to unique equilibria. Sargent and Wallace argue that this
indeterminacy makes it risky to use interest rates as an instrument and hence gives money
growth policies a natural advantage over interest rate policies.
McCallum [1981] and Woodford [2003] enrich the space of interest rate policies beyond
that considered by Sargent and Wallace by allowing these policies to depend on the history of
past actions as well as on the history of exogenous shocks, but restrict them to be the same
on and oﬀ the equilibrium path. With such restricted policies, McCallum and Woodford show
that equilibria need not be indeterminate. For example, Woodford considers a class of Taylor
rules and shows that equilibria are determinate if and only if the policy satisﬁes the Taylor
principle: the central bank should raise its interest rate more than one-for-one following an
increase in expected inﬂation. More precisely, Woodford shows that if the policy satisﬁes the
Taylor principle, the economy has a unique equilibrium, while if it violates that principle, the
economy has a continuum of equilibria.
We make two contributions to this literature. One is to show that indeterminacy under
interest rate rules can be completely eliminated by further enriching the policy space to allow
sophisticated policies, by which we mean policies that can diﬀer on and oﬀ the equilibrium path.
In our model, this enrichment is particularly desirable because the policy associated with the
best equilibrium violates the Taylor principle. Within the class of policy rules considered by
Woodford [2003], the best outcome lies in the indeterminate region, while with our sophisticated
policies, the best outcome can be implemented as a unique equilibrium. (For diﬀerent proposed
resolutions to the indeterminacy issue, see Bassetto [2002] and Adão, Correia, and Teles [2006].)
In eﬀect, we have turned the Sargent and Wallace [1975] criticism of interest rate policies
on its head. Sargent and Wallace argue that equilibrium indeterminacy gives interest rates a
natural disadvantage relative to money growth rates as an instrument. We show that this inde-
terminacy implies that the tightness of interest rates varies endogenously with the equilibrium.
A sophisticated speciﬁcation of interest rate policies that exploits the endogenous tightness sup-
ports a unique equilibrium with the best outcomes. Thus, endogenous tightness gives interest
rates a natural advantage over money growth rates.
Our other contribution is to formalize the idea that more transparent instruments have a
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prices like interest rates and exchange rates. Calvo and Végh [1999, p. 1589], for example,
argue:
By the simple virtue of being a price rather than a quantity, the exchange rate
provides a much clearer signal to the public of the central bank’s intentions and
actual actions than a money supply target.
Clearly, Calvo and Vegh’s [1999] comment applies equally well to the greater transparency of
interest rates over money growth rates. Yet, even though Persson and Tabellini [1994] agree
that the exchange rate is more transparent than money growth, they speak for many when
they point out the need to formalize the idea that more transparent instruments have a natural
advantage over less transparent ones. Referring to the exchange rate, Persson and Tabellini
[1994, p. 17] write:
In particular, it is easily observable, so the private sector can directly monitor any
broken promises by the central bank. But we know of no convincing argument
that turns these properties into an explanation for why it would be a more eﬃcient
method to achieve credibility to target the exchange rate rather than, say, the money
growth rate.
Here we provide what we think is that convincing argument.
We establish our results regarding the desirability of tightness and transparency in a
simple monetary model (that of Woodford [2003]). This model has a Phillips curve that links
output to unexpected inﬂation and an Euler equation that links growth rates in output to real
interest rates. The Euler equation is subject to distortionary shocks. We enrich the model
by including a relationship between (intended) money growth and inﬂation that is subject to
random shocks and a purchasing power relationship that links domestic inﬂation, the change
in the exchange rate, and foreign inﬂation.
We ﬁrst analyze the optimal instrument choice in an environment in which the policymaker
can commit to its future policies. We say that the transparency of money is irrelevant if, for all
parameter values, the optimal instrument is the same both when money is opaque and when
3it is transparent. We show that the transparency of money is irrelevant under commitment in
this sense. Regardless of whether money growth is observed or not, the central bank commits
to a policy rule at the beginning of time, and deviations from that rule are simply prohibited.
Hence, the central bank has no incentive constraints for which the lack of observability of its
action may be relevant.
We then turn to an analysis of tightness under commitment. In our model, the tightness of
money growth and exchange rates is exogenous. When these are the only instruments available,
the analysis is similar to that of Poole [1970], and the tighter instrument is preferred. In terms
of the tightness of interest rates, we show that when policies are restricted to be the same
on and oﬀ the equilibrium path and when the Taylor principle is violated, the equilibria are
indeterminate. The best equilibrium has a policy rule that violates the Taylor principle on the
equilibrium path. The associated outcome has lower variability of output and inﬂation than
any of the equilibria that satisfy the Taylor principle and has higher welfare.
This best outcome is supported as a unique equilibrium by sophisticated policies, in which
if private agents deviate from the best outcome, the central bank switches policies in such a
way as to make it not optimal for any individual private agent to deviate. In particular, after
a deviation, the central bank chooses policies so that the original choice is optimal for each
private agent. Thus, even if an individual private agent believes that all other private agents
have deviated, this agent will choose not to deviate. Hence, no such deviations can occur, and
the equilibrium is unique.
We then turn to an analysis of the role of transparency in an environment in which the
policymaker cannot commit to its future policies. Here we ﬁnd it notationally convenient to
focus on the choice between money and exchange rates. The analysis of other prices, like interest
rates, is nearly identical.
We model the idea of Persson and Tabellini [1994], Calvo and Végh [1999], and others
that exchange rates are transparent and money growth is opaque as follows. We assume that
agents can see the exchange rate. We follow Cukierman and Meltzer [1986] and Faust and
Svensson [2001, 2002] in assuming that when the central bank uses money as its instrument,
it chooses an action, which is not directly observed by private agents, referred to as intended
money growth. Private agents observe the actual growth rate of the monetary aggregate, which
4depends on intended money growth as well as on domestic shocks to the ﬁnancial system.
The intuition for our results regarding transparency is as follows. Our model has a time
inconsistency problem in that using either instrument, without commitment, the central bank
has a temptation to surprise the public with higher than expected inﬂa t i o ni no r d e rt od e c r e a s e
unemployment. In order to achieve a good outcome, the equilibrium strategies must provide
incentives for the central bank to resist the temptation by providing high payoﬀs when it chooses
low inﬂation and low payoﬀs when it chooses high inﬂation. With a transparent instrument,
any deviation is perfectly detectable, and along the equilibrium path, only high payoﬀs will
occur. With an opaque instrument, however, to deter deviations to high money growth, the
equilibrium strategies must ensure that high realizations of inﬂation are followed by low payoﬀs
for the central bank. Since high realizations of inﬂa t i o nw i l lo c c u re v e ni ft h ec e n t r a lb a n kd o e s
not deviate, with such strategies at least some period of low payoﬀs for the central bank must
be realized in equilibrium. Thus, when both instruments are equally tight, the transparent one
is preferred.
Our analysis is related to several literatures beyond those mentioned above. Our analysis
of tightness incorporates the classic Mundellian trade-oﬀ between using the money growth rate
and using the exchange rate as the monetary instrument. (For a recent model with such a
trade-oﬀ, see the work by Alesina and Barro [2002] on currency unions.)
Our analysis of transparency is related to that of Canzoneri [1985], who assumes that a
private information problem arises under a money regime because the money growth rate is
an opaque instrument. Canzoneri [1985] focuses on characterizing equilibrium outcomes when
money growth is an opaque instrument. Our focus is on the role of transparent and opaque
instruments.1
Our analysis is most closely related to the work of Herrendorf [1997] and Stokey [2003].
Herrendorf [1997] considers an optimal taxation game in which the monetary authority must
ﬁnance a given amount of spending with a combination of direct taxes and inﬂation taxes. The
monetary authority can choose a transparent ﬁxed exchange rate regime in which it must set
some ﬁxed suboptimal exchange rate peg or an opaque money regime in which it is free to
choose any rate of money growth.2 Stokey [2003] builds on our analysis from an earlier draft of
our work here, but focuses on using simple two-state Markov perfect equilibria and shows how
5to solve for the best equilibria in this class under either a money regime or an exchange rate
regime.
Finally, our recursive method for analyzing a monetary model is related to that of Chang
[1998].
I. The Model
The model we use to analyze the optimal choice of a monetary policy instrument is a
modiﬁed version of a standard, linearized model of monetary policy.
I.A. The Determinants of Output & Inﬂation
In the model, time is discrete, and periods are denoted t =0 ,1,2,.... The economy
consists of a continuum of private agents and a central bank. The economy’s output in any
period yt is determined by a Phillips curve
yt = πt − xt, (1)
where πt is the economy’s inﬂation rate from period t − 1 to t and xt is the (change in the)
average wage.
The relationship between domestic inﬂation πt and the rate of change in the exchange
rate et is given by




t has a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance σ2
π∗.T h e v a r i a b l e π∗
t reﬂects
a combination of inﬂation in foreign economies and shocks to the real exchange rate (that is,
deviations from purchasing power parity). For simplicity, we refer to et as the exchange rate
and π∗
t as foreign inﬂation. We let g(πt|et) denote the density of domestic inﬂation given the
choice of exchange rate et.
We let μt be the central bank’s intended growth rate of money. The relation between
intended money growth μt and inﬂation is
πt = μt + εt, (3)
6where εt represents domestic shocks that are normally distributed with mean 0 and variance
σ2
ε.W e l e t f(πt|μt) denote the density of domestic inﬂation given the choice of the intended
money growth rate μt.
Interest rates it enter the model through a linearized intertemporal Euler equation
yt = Et [yt+1] − σ(it − Et [πt+1]) + ηt, (4)
where ηt is an i.i.d. mean zero normal shock with variance σ2
η, σ determines the intertem-
poral elasticity, and Et denotes the expectations of a representative agent given that agent’s
information in period t, which includes the shock ηt.
At the beginning of each period, the central bank chooses to operate under one of three
regimes: the (crawling peg) exchange rate regime, the money regime, or the interest rate regime.
In the exchange rate regime, the central bank sets et; in the money regime, μt;a n di nt h ei n t e r e s t
rate regime, it. Notice that in both the exchange rate and money regimes, the central bank
eﬀectively chooses the mean inﬂation rate, and the variance of this inﬂation rate is determined
by shocks outside of the central bank’s control. In the interest rate regime, the inﬂation rate is
not directly under the central bank’s control. It is determined by the equilibrium conditions.
In all three regimes, (1)—(4) hold, and the unchosen variables are residually determined.
I.B. Payoﬀs
Letting zt denote the representative agent’s individual wage rate and recalling that xt
denotes the corresponding average rate of wage change, we let the representative agent’s per-













where ¯ y is the preferred level of output. Note, from the right side of (5), that the payoﬀ depends
on the unexpected changes in this agent’s real wages and the domestic economy’s output and







where β is the discount factor and we have normalized the per-period payoﬀ by (1 − β). The
central bank seeks to maximize the representative agent’s utility.
7I.C. Tightness & Transparency
Here we deﬁne more precisely our notions of tightness and transparency of alternative
monetary policy instruments.
One measure of the extent of control associated with an instrument is the variability
of inﬂation conditional on the instrument, namely, var(πt|et), var(πt|μt), var(πt|it). We say
that one instrument, say, the money growth rate, is tighter than another instrument, say, the
exchange rate, if and only if, for all periods, for the same mean inﬂation rate, the conditional
variance of inﬂation is less with the money instrument than with the exchange rate instrument,
that is, when var(πt|μt) < var(πt|et) with E(πt|μt)=E(πt|et) for all t. Note from (2) and (3)
that money growth rates are tighter than exchange rates if and only if σ2
ε <σ 2
π∗. Clearly, the
tightness of both exchange rates and money growth rates is exogenous in the sense that it is
independent of the particular policy chosen. This property holds because (2) and (3) imply a
static relation between the instrument and inﬂation. In contrast, the tightness of interest rates
is endogenous in the sense that the conditional variance var(πt|it) depends on the particular
policy chosen. As we show below, this property holds because the relation between inﬂation
and this instrument is an intertemporal one and depends on the expectations of private agents.
Persson and Tabellini [1994], Calvo and Végh [1999], and others consider exchange rates
to be more transparent than money growth rates because exchange rates are easier for the pub-
lic to monitor. One motivation for this assumption is the observation that private agents deal
with these prices in their day-to-day aﬀairs, essentially obtaining information about these mon-
etary policy instruments at no cost. Acquiring and interpreting information about monetary
aggregates is, by comparison, costly.
We assume that under both regimes, agents can see the exchange rate et, the interest rate
it,a n dt h ed o m e s t i ci n ﬂation rate πt but not the intended money growth rate μt. Thus, under
an exchange rate regime, for example, agents directly see the actions of the central bank, while
under a money regime, they see only a noisy signal of the central bank’s actions. We thus refer
to exchange rates and interest rates as transparent instruments a n dt ot h em o n e yg r o w t hr a t e
as the opaque instrument.
A plausible interpretation of our opaqueness assumption is that monetary aggregates do
not perfectly reveal the actions of the central banks, referred to, again, as intended money
8growth. (This interpretation follows that of Cukierman and Meltzer [1986] and Faust and
Svensson [2001].) In this interpretation, private agents observe a signal st given by
st = μt + εt.
We think of st as being the observed money growth rate (say, the growth rate of M3), and we
think of μt as the collection of central bank monetary policy actions, such as open market oper-
ations, discount window operations, and quantitative restrictions on bank lending, all intended
to move the observed money growth rate toward the rate actually intended. We think of εt as
at y p eo fcontrol error arising from shocks to the ﬁnancial system. In the model here, we have
πt = st,s ot h a ti n ﬂation equals observed money growth. All of our results go through if we
allow for shocks in the relationship between observed money growth and inﬂation, so that
πt = st + νt,
where νt is an i.i.d. shock, thought of as a velocity shock. In this case, the tightness of money
is the sum of the variances of the control error εt and the velocity shock νt.
Notice that we can interpret a transparent instrument in a similar way. For example, we
can suppose that the signal of the policy is the exchange rate, the variance of the control error
is zero, and the relation between the signal and inﬂation is subject to shocks. (Here, st = et,
and πt = st + π∗
t.)
II. With Commitment: Only Tightness Matters
We begin our analysis of tightness and transparency by considering a setup in which the
central bank can commit to its policy. We establish that under such commitment, transparency
is irrelevant for the choice of the optimal instrument; the relative desirability of an instrument
depends only on its tightness. We then show that in such a setup, interest rates have a natural
advantage over money growth rates as monetary policy instruments.
II.A. Money & Exchange Rates
We begin our analysis by considering policy instruments relevant for economies with
poorly developed ﬁnancial markets. Such economies cannot use interest rates as a monetary
policy instrument, so we consider a version of our model without interest rates as an option.
9In this model, the idea behind commitment by the central bank is that at the beginning of
period 0, the central bank chooses rules governing its monetary policy in period t as a function
of the history of what it has observed up until that time and cannot deviate from them.
Within each period, the timing of actions is as follows. At the beginning of a period,
private agents choose their nominal wages. The central bank then sets either an exchange rate
regime or a money growth regime according to the rule chosen in period 0. The choice of regime
is observable. Finally, the central bank sets either the rate of change in the exchange rate or
the rate of growth of the money supply.
We begin with the problem of the representative private agent in some period t.A n
agent’s choice of the change in the agent’s own wage rate, zt, depends on whether the policy
rule prescribes that the regime in the current period is an exchange rate regime or a money
regime. We denote these choices by zet and zμt and the corresponding average wage rates by
xe and xμ. Clearly, given (5), under either regime, agents aim to choose wages equal to mean
inﬂation, either e or μ, depending on the regime, so that
zet =
Z
πtg(πt|et)dπ = et and zμt =
Z
πtf(πt|μt)dπ = μt. (7)
In what follows, we focus on equilibria that are symmetric; all agents choose the same
individual wage rates, so that xet = zet and xμt = zμt. Thus, all agents have the same utility.
The central bank’s expected payoﬀsa r eS(xet,e t)=
R
rA(xet,x et,πt)g(π|et) dπ and R(xμt,μ t)=
R
rA(xμt,x μt,πt)f(π|μt) dπ under the exchange rate and money regimes, respectively. With our

































Notice that the central bank’s expected payoﬀs in the two regimes are symmetric with respect
to the policy variables et and μt. In particular, the functions S and R diﬀer only with respect
to the uncontrollable variances σ2
π∗ and σ2
ε, which are constants.
Since (1)—(3) are all static, the central bank’s problem reduces to a static one. If the
central bank chooses the exchange rate regime, using (7) and xet = zet in (8) gives that the
c e n t r a lb a n ks o l v e smaxe S(e,e). If instead the central bank chooses the money regime, using
10(7) and xμt = zμt in (9) gives that the central bank solves maxμ R(μ,μ). The central bank then
picks the regime with the higher utility. Given the symmetry of (8) and (9), we see that the
preferred regime is the one with the lower variance of shocks. We then have
Proposition 1. Only Tightness Matters with Commitment
When the central bank can commit to its monetary policies, the tighter instrument is
preferred regardless of its transparency. Thus, with commitment, the exchange rate regime
is preferred to a money regime if and only if σ2
π∗ ≤ σ2
ε.
Here we have shown one sense in which transparency is irrelevant. A more general sense of
irrelevance comes from comparing two environments, one in which, as above, money is opaque
and exchange rates are transparent and another in which both instruments are transparent.
Transparency is irrelevant if the optimal instrument is the same in both environments for all
parameter values. Transparency is clearly irrelevant in this more general sense as well.
II.B. Money & Interest Rates
Now we consider a version of our model with money growth rates and interest rates instead
of exchange rates. Developed countries do have interest rates as a monetary policy instrument,
so this version of the model is more relevant for them. They, of course, could also choose
another price, exchange rates, but we omit that option here for notational convenience.
We ﬁrst deﬁne a precise notion of competitive equilibrium and argue that here also trans-
parency is irrelevant under commitment.
We then consider the implications of the endogenous tightness of interest rates. We
begin with a conventional way of modeling policies under commitment, referred to as restricted
policies in which policies and allocations are linear rules that feed back on the history of events
and actions. This way of modeling policies is standard in the macroeconomics literature. (See,
for example, Woodford [2003].) We show that when such policies satisfy the Taylor principle,
interest rate rules give rise to a unique equilibrium, and when they do not, equilibrium is
indeterminate.
We then consider a notion of equilibrium in which policies and allocations are functions
of past actions as well as exogenous shocks, referred to as an equilibrium with sophisticated
11policies. Note that this formulation allows policies to react to deviations by private agents.
We show that any competitive equilibrium can be uniquely implemented with sophisticated
policies. Interestingly, with sophisticated policies, the best interest rate policy violates the
Taylor principle. Moreover, interest rate policies have a natural advantage over money growth
policies in the sense that even if the interest rate shock ηt has the same variance as the money
growth shock εt, interest rate policies are strictly preferred.
In a version of the model that includes exchange rates, similar arguments would imply
that when the interest rate shock has the same variance as the exchange rate shock π∗
t, interest
rate policies are strictly preferred to exchange rate policies.
II.B.1. Competitive Equilibrium
First we describe the history of events and actions in our model with commitment and
the outcomes under a competitive equilibrium. We see that here transparency is irrelevant in
the choice of a monetary policy instrument.
The public events that occur in a period are, in chronological order, qt =( xt;δt,i t;ηt,y t,πt),
where δt = M denotes the money regime and δt = E, the exchange rate regime. Letting ht
denote the history of these events from period 0 up to and including period t,w eh a v et h a t
ht =( ht−1,q t) for t ≥ 1 and h0 = q0. As a matter of notational convenience, we focus on perfect
public equilibria in which the central bank’s strategy is a function of only the public history.
The public history faced by private agents in period t when they set their wages is ht−1.
The public history faced by the central bank (or government) when it sets its regime and either
its money growth or interest rate policy is hgt =( ht−1,x t). A strategy for private agents is a
sequence of rules σz = {zt(ht−1)} for choosing wages for every possible public history, while
average wages are given by σx = {xt(ht−1)}. A strategy for the central bank is a sequence of
rules for choosing the regime, {δt(hgt)} as well as the policy within the regime, either μt(hgt)
or it(hgt).
If the money regime is chosen in period t (δt(hgt)=M), then interest rates it(hyt(M)) as
well as output yt(hyt(M)) and inﬂation rates πt(hyt(M)) are determined residually from (1)—(4)
after the relevant shocks are realized, where hyt(M)=( ht−1,x t;M,μt;ηt,ε t) is the history that
determines output, inﬂation, and interest rates in the current period.
I f ,i n s t e a d ,i np e r i o dt the interest rate regime is chosen (δt(hgt)=I), then the money
12growth rate μt(hyt(I)) as well as output yt(hyt(I)) and inﬂation πt(hyt(I)) are determined
residually from (1)—(4) after the relevant shocks are realized, where hyt(I)=( ht−1,x t;I,it;ηt,ε t)
is the history that determines output, inﬂation, and money growth in the current period.
We let σg denote the regime choice and the policies under that regime. At the end
of period t, output and inﬂation are determined as functions of the relevant history of the
game hyt(δt) a c c o r d i n gt ot h er u l e syt(hyt(δt)) and πt(hyt(δt)). We let σy = {yt(hyt(δt))} and
σπ = {πt(hyt(δt))} denote the sequences of output and inﬂation rules.
In any equilibrium, the representative agent’s wage equals that agent’s expectation of
inﬂation. We write this condition as
zt(ht−1)=E[πt|ht−1]. (10)
In (10), given ht−1 agents use the average wage rule xt(ht−1), the central bank’s strategies, and
the distribution of exogenous shocks to forecast the distribution of inﬂation.
A competitive equilibrium given the policies here is a collection of strategies (σg,σz,σ x)
and output and inﬂation rules (σy,σπ) such that, given σg and σx,σ z is optimal, in that for all
histories, the average wage equals the representative agent’s wage
xt(ht−1)=zt(ht−1) (11)
and the output rule, the inﬂation rule, and the residually determined policy choice satisfy
(1)—(3). In light of condition (11) and the observation that given (σg,σ x), output, inﬂation,
and the residually determined policy choice are mechanically given by (1)—(3), we summarize
a competitive equilibrium by (σg,σx). Note for later, from (10) and (11), that
xt(ht−1)=E[πt|ht−1]. (12)
Associated with each competitive equilibrium σ =( σg,σx) are the particular stochastic
processes for outcomes that occur along the equilibrium path. These outcomes can be generated
from the strategies in the standard recursive fashion. Clearly, these outcomes can be written
as a function of the history of exogenous events st =( s0,...,s t),w h e r est =( εt,η t). These
(on the equilibrium path) outcomes include allocations a(σ)={xt(st−1;σ),πt(st;σ),y t(st;σ)}.
We call an allocation a(σ) associated with a competitive equilibrium σ a competitive allocation.
13Later, we often suppress explicit dependence on σ. We also let a denote allocations of the form
{xt(st−1),πt(st),y t(st)}.
We deﬁne a Ramsey allocation to be the allocation a associated with a competitive equi-
librium σ that maximizes the central bank’s payoﬀ in period 0 over the set of all competitive
allocations.
Clearly, in the model described here, transparency is irrelevant in the more general sense
described above. Regardless of whether money growth is observed or not, the central bank
commits to a policy rule in period 0 and over time, and deviations from that rule are sim-
ply prohibited. Hence, the central bank has no incentive constraints for which the lack of
observability of its action may be relevant. The analog of Proposition 1 thus holds.
We now turn to characterizing the set of equilibrium outcomes. We begin with a simple
lemma. The lemma shows that under any interest rate rule, the expected inﬂation rate is
uniquely determined by the policy, but the realized inﬂation rate may not be.
Lemma. In any history ht−1,
E [yt|ht−1]=0 . (13)
If that history gives rise to an interest rate regime, then
E [πt+1|ht−1]=it(hgt), (14)
where hgt = (ht−1,x t(ht−1)).
Proof. Taking expectations of the Phillips curve equation (1) with respect to ht−1 gives
E [yt|ht−1]=E [πt|ht−1] − xt(ht−1).
U s i n g( 1 2 ) ,w et h e nh a v et h a tE [yt|ht−1]=0for all t,w h i c hp r o v e s( 1 3 ) .
Taking expectations of the Euler equation (4) with respect to ht−1 gives
E [yt|ht−1]=E [yt+1|ht−1] − σ(it(ht−1) − E [πt+1|ht−1]). (15)
Using the law of iterated expectations gives that E [yt+1|ht−1]=0 . From (15) we then have (14),
that E [πt+1|ht−1]=it(hgt). Q.E.D.
14II.B.2. Equilibrium with Restricted Policies
The standard way to model policies under commitment is to restrict policies and allo-
cations to linear feedback rules (that agree on and oﬀ the equilibrium path). We show here
that with such restricted policies, a model like ours produces the standard result: interest rate
policies produce a unique equilibrium only when the policies satisfy the Taylor principle.
Policies of the Taylor rule form are given by
it =¯ ı + aEt−1πt + bEt−1yt, (16)
where ¯ ı is a constant. When the parameter a>1, such policies are said to satisfy the Taylor
principle, namely, that the central bank should raise its interest rate more than one-for-one
with increases in inﬂation. When a<1, such policies are said to violate that principle.
Of course, the Taylor rule is not a well-deﬁned function of histories until we ﬁll in how
expectations are formed. From the lemma, we know that E [yt|ht−1]=0 . Since E [πt|ht−1]=xt,
policies of the Taylor rule form can be written as
it =¯ ı + axt. (17)
We follow the literature in focusing on equilibria in which all outcomes are linear functions
of the history. As is well-known, in economies like ours, if the Taylor principle is violated, a large
number of such equilibria are associated with a given restricted policy, while if the principle is
satisﬁed, a unique bounded linear equilibrium is associated with the policy. Formally, here we
have
Proposition 2. Determinacy of Equilibrium and the Taylor Principle
The linear equilibria with interest rate rules of the Taylor rule form (17) have outcomes
of the form
xt+1 = it + cηt,π t = xt +( 1+σc)ηt, and yt =( 1+σc)ηt. (18)
For every a<1 and¯ ı, the economy has a continuum of equilibria indexed by the parameter
c.F o re v e r ya ≥ 1 and ¯ ı, within the class of bounded linear equilibria, the economy has
a unique equilibrium with c =0 .
15Proof. F r o mt h el e m m a ,w ek n o wt h a tE [πt+1|ht−1]=it(hgt). From the form of the Taylor
rule (16), we know that E [πt+1|ht−1]=¯ ı+axt;f r o m( 12) and linearity, we then have that all lin-
ear equilibria must satisfy (18). If a<1, verifying that the outcomes for πt and yt are equilibria
for any value of c follows from verifying the equilibrium conditions. If a>1, clearly any nonzero
value of c implies that xt is unbounded. Q.E.D.
The intuitive idea behind the multiplicity of equilibria in Proposition 2 is that interest
rates pin down only expected inﬂation and not the state-by-state realizations indexed by the
parameter c.
Here we have focused on linear Taylor rules. Now consider more general rules of the
form it = f(xt), where f is a smooth function. Suppose that a steady-state equilibrium exists
with xt = xss. It is straightforward to adapt standard arguments to show the following. If
f0(xss) < 1, then the economy has a continuum of equilibria converging to xss. If f0(xss) > 1,
then the equilibria are locally determinate and coincide with the linear equilibria that satisfy
the Taylor principle.
Interestingly, it turns out that equilibria that satisfy the Taylor principle are ineﬃcient
in that they are dominated by an equilibrium that violates that principle. Consider the best
equilibrium outcomes in the class considered in Proposition 2. Clearly, the optimal average
inﬂation rate is zero. From the lemma, this outcome is accomplished by setting it =0for all t
and, hence, ¯ ı = a =0 . Given the form of the objective function in (6), the best equilibrium then
minimizes the sum of the variances of inﬂation and output. From the form of the equilibrium in
Proposition 2, the variance of inﬂation is (1+σc)2σ2
η +c2σ2
η, and that of output is (1+σc)2σ2
η.
Notice that starting at c =0 , a small decrease in c reduces the variance of both inﬂation and
output and thus raises welfare. More generally, the value of c that maximizes welfare is
c = −2σ/(1 + 2σ
2). (19)
We summarize this discussion with a proposition.
Proposition 3. Rules Satisfying the Taylor Principle Are Inefficient
The outcomes under a Taylor rule of the form (17) with a>1 are dominated by the
outcomes of an equilibrium with a =0and ¯ ı =0 .
16To get some intuition for this proposition, think of ηt as a type of demand shock, a shock
that distorts the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution. When ηt is positive, the Euler
equation (4) implies that for a given value of expected consumption and real interest rates,
desired consumption at t rises. In a determinate equilibrium, c =0 . Hence, when desired
consumption at t rises, actual consumption rises one-for-one. For the economy to produce this
increased output, the Phillips curve (1) implies that (unexpected) inﬂation must rise one-for-
one as well. The opposite happens when the shock to marginal utility is negative. Hence, in
this economy, output and inﬂation simply inherit the variability of the demand shock.
Now consider an equilibrium of the sort considered in Proposition 2 with c negative.
In this equilibrium, when the demand shock is positive, real interest rates in (4) rise because
expected inﬂation rises. This rise in real interest rates dampens the rise in desired consumption.
Actual consumption then rises less than one-for-one with the shock, and from the Phillips curve
we know that inﬂation does too. Thus, the variability of output and that of inﬂation are lower
in this equilibrium than in a determinate equilibrium.
We have shown that in the best equilibrium ¯ ı =0 ,a=0 ,a n dc<0. The problem,
however, is that this equilibrium lies in the indeterminate region. If a central bank follows a
policy of setting a =0 , the best outcome may be realized. However, any of a continuum of
worse outcomes could also be realized. This possibility makes following a policy of setting ¯ ı =0
risky relative to one that satisﬁes the Taylor principle.
In the next section, we argue that the indeterminacy of equilibria in this economy is
entirely an artifact of the restrictions placed on policies and that once these restrictions are
removed, the best equilibrium can be uniquely implemented.
II.B.3. Equilibrium with Sophisticated Policies
Here we show that by allowing central bank behavior after deviations by private agents
to be diﬀerent from central bank behavior when agents do not deviate, we can implement
any outcome path associated with restricted policies as a unique equilibrium, including those
that violate the Taylor principle. The indeterminacy of equilibrium with a<1 arises because
restricted policies specify the same policy rule both on and oﬀ the equilibrium path; that is,
they specify the same rule for all histories of choices, including deviations by private agents.
(Since we are considering environments with commitment, deviations by the central bank are
17irrelevant.) We call policies that are not so restricted sophisticated policies.
Suppose that interest rates are the chosen policy instrument. Fix a desired outcome path
(ˆ xt(st−1), ˆ πt(st), ˆ yt(st)) together with central bank policies ˆ ıt(st−1). Consider the following
trigger-type policy that supports these outcomes as unique equilibria: If the history of private
actions coincides with the desired outcomes, then let central bank policy in period t beˆ ıt(st−1).
If the history up until period t−1 coincides with the desired outcomes, but the wage rate chosen
by private agents xt 6=ˆ xt(st−1),t h e ni np e r i o dt and thereafter switch to a money regime with
m o n e yg r o w t hi nag i v e np e r i o de q u a lt ot h ee x p e c t e dv a l u eo fi n ﬂation for that period in the
original equilibrium. That is, in period r ≥ t,s e tμr(sr−1)=ˆ xr(sr−1).
Clearly, under such a policy, for a private agent the expected inﬂation rate is ˆ xt(st−1)
regardless of the behavior of other private agents. Hence, each private agent sets zt(st−1)=
ˆ xt(st−1). Thus, the equilibrium is unique.
We summarize this discussion with a proposition:
Proposition 4. Unique Equilibrium with Sophisticated Policies
Any competitive equilibrium outcome can be implemented as a unique equilibrium with
sophisticated policies.
In proving Proposition 4, we have assumed that after a deviation by private agents, the
central bank switches to a money regime. Alternatively, we could have used the following
t r i g g e r - t y p ep o l i c yi nw h i c ht h ec e n t r a lb a n ks t a y si na ni n t e r e s tr a t er e g i m eb o t ho na n do ﬀ
the equilibrium path. We support a desired outcome path (ˆ xt(st−1), ˆ πt(st), ˆ yt(st)) together
w i t hc e n t r a lb a n kp o l i c i e si∗
t(st−1) as a unique equilibrium as follows. If the history of private
actions coincides with the desired outcomes, then let central bank policy in period t beˆ ıt(st−1).
If the history up until period t − 1 coincides with the desired outcomes, but the wage rate
chosen by private agents xt 6= xt(st−1),t h e ni np e r i o dt and thereafter switch to a policy rule
that satisﬁes the Taylor principle but has the same expected inﬂation as the original outcome
path. This strategy will lead to a unique equilibrium.
Note that since outcomes with restricted and sophisticated policies coincide along the
equilibrium path, data from the equilibrium of the model cannot be used to determine whether
restricted or sophisticated policies are being followed.
18We turn now to the optimal choice of a monetary policy instrument under commitment
when sophisticated policies are allowed. The optimal money growth policy has μt =0in all
periods. This leads to zero inﬂation on average, and the resulting variance of both inﬂation
and output is σ2
ε. To see if interest rates have a natural advantage over money growth rates,
we begin by considering a suboptimal interest rate policy that sets the interest rate it =0
along the equilibrium path and implements an equilibrium of the form of Proposition 2 with
c =0 . This policy leads to zero inﬂation on average, and the resulting variance of both inﬂation
and output is σ2
ε. If σ2
ε = σ2
η, then welfare under this suboptimal interest rate policy is equal
to welfare under the best money growth policy. Hence, welfare is strictly greater under the
optimal interest rate policy than under the optimal money growth policy. We then have the
following proposition:
Proposition 5. The Natural Advantage of Interest Rates
If σ2
ε = σ2
η, then interest rates are strictly preferred to money growth rates as a policy
instrument.
In sum, we have shown that with sophisticated policies, interest rate policies need not lead
to indeterminacy. We have noted that in terms of observed outcomes, those under restricted
policies coincide with those under sophisticated policies. Finally, we have also shown that
because the tightness of interest rates is endogenous, policy can be chosen so as to make
interest rates tighter than the variance of the interest shock ηt.
III. Without Commitment: Transparency Matters Too
In our model this lack of commitment leads to a time inconsistency problem. Now we
consider a setup in which the central bank cannot commit to its policies. We show that in this
setup, both tightness and transparency matter, and a transparent instrument has a natural
advantage over an opaque one. For notational convenience, we focus on an economy with just
money and exchange rates. (The analysis with money and interest rates is similar.)
We model the lack of commitment by assuming the following timing of actions within each
period. We suppose that the central bank cannot commit to its policies. In each period, agents
19set their wages, and then the central bank chooses the regime and the level of its monetary
policy instrument. For this environment, we show that transparency is a desirable feature for
an instrument. Speciﬁcally, we show that if the exchange rate and the money growth rate
are equally tight instruments, then given any equilibrium in which the central bank chooses a
money regime in some period t, we can construct another equilibrium in which the central bank
chooses instead an exchange rate regime in period t and obtains a strictly higher payoﬀ.T h u s ,
even if money growth is the tighter instrument, an exchange rate regime is preferred because
of its transparency. We say, therefore, that the exchange rate’s greater transparency gives it a
natural advantage as a monetary policy instrument.
III.A. Strategies & Constraints
A perfect equilibrium in this environment is a collection of strategies σ such that (i)a f t e r
every history ht−1, the private agents’ strategy σz is optimal given the central bank’s strategy
σg and the average of agents’ wages σx; (ii) after every history hgt, the central bank’s strategy
δt(hgt) and the relevant policy choice, either et(hgt) or μt(hgt), are optimal given the average of
agents’ wages σx; and (iii) after every history ht−1,σ z and σx agree.
In this analysis, we will formulate the incentive constraint of the central bank recursively,
by drawing on the work of Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti [1986, 1990]. Their basic idea applied
to our model comes from a simple insight. It starts with the recognition that in order to
evaluate the central bank’s incentive constraints, we need not specify the whole sequence of
future actions for the central bank and private agents that follow every possible current action
that the central bank might take. Rather, all we need specify is how the central bank’s payoﬀ
from the next period on–its continuation value–will vary as the central bank’s current action
varies. This simple observation forms the basis for a recursive approach to describing the
incentive compatibility constraints for the central bank.
To formulate the incentive constraint of the central bank recursively, we use the fact that
strategies induce continuation values in a natural way. Fix a collection of strategies σ =( σg,σx).
For any history, these strategies imply a stochastic outcome path and an associated expected
discounted value of utility, referred to as a continuation value. Suppose that, in period t
following history hgt, the central bank has chosen a money regime (δt(hgt)=M) and private
agents have chosen a wage xt. Since agents observe only inﬂation πt = μt +εt, which is a noisy
20signal of μt, the equilibrium following period t as speciﬁed in a collection of strategies σ cannot
depend on the central bank’s choice of μt directly; it can vary only with inﬂation πt. Hence,
the central bank’s continuation value from next period can depend only on πt and hgt. (Note
that it is redundant to have these strategies vary with yt as well.) Denote the continuation
value function under a money regime by wμt+1(πt,h gt). Likewise, denote the continuation value
function under an exchange rate regime by wet+1(et,h gt).
In each period, the central bank has two types of incentive constraints, one for the choice
of regime and one for the choice of policy within each regime. Working backward, consider
ﬁrst the incentive constraint for money growth in the money regime in period t. Suppose that
the strategy σg speciﬁes that the central bank choose μt(hgt) in the current period. Given the
current wage chosen by the agents xt and the continuation value function wμt+1(πt,h t), the
incentive constraint requires that there be no other money growth rate, μ0
t 6= μt(hgt), such that
the central bank could beneﬁt by deviating to μ0
t in period t a n dt h e na c t i n ga c c o r d i n gt oi t s
strategy σg from period t +1on; that is,










for any possible μ0
t and for all hgt. (Recall that R and S represent the central bank’s expected
payoﬀs under a money regime and an exchange rate regime, respectively.) Notice that here
ad e v i a t i o nμ0
t from the speciﬁed current action μt(hgt) aﬀects the central bank’s expected
discounted payoﬀ only by shifting the distribution of inﬂation from f(π|μt(hgt)) to f(π|μ0
t).
Consider next the incentive constraint for the exchange rate in the exchange rate regime
in period t. Given the wage xt chosen by agents, this incentive constraint is





for any possible e0
t and hgt.
Finally, consider the incentive constraint for the choice of regime. In period t, after history
hgt, the money regime is optimal, δt(hgt)=M, only if




et (1 − β)S(xt,e t) + βwet+1(et,h t).
Likewise, the exchange rate regime is optimal, δt(hgt)=E, if an analogous constraint holds.
Notice that in (20), (21), and (22) we are only considering one-shot deviations, that is,
changes in the current actions, holding ﬁxed the future strategies. A standard result in game
theory says that since the payoﬀs of the central bank are bounded, these recursive incentive
constraints are both necessary and suﬃcient for full incentive compatibility.
III.B. Transparency’s Advantage
The following proposition establishes the precise advantage of the transparent instrument
when the central bank cannot commit to its policies.
Proposition 6. The Advantage of Transparency
When two monetary policy instruments have equal tightness and the central bank cannot
commit to its monetary policies, the transparent instrument is preferred to the opaque
instrument in the following sense: For any equilibrium σ in which the money regime is
chosen in at least one period, there is an equilibrium ˜ σ with higher welfare in which the
exchange rate regime is chosen in all periods.
The idea of the proof of this proposition is the following. To achieve a good outcome, the
continuation payoﬀ must have two features simultaneously. It must deter the central bank from
deviating from the prescribed policy, and it must give the central bank a high continuation
payoﬀ when the central bank does not deviate.
With a transparent instrument, any deviation is perfectly detectable, and these two fea-
tures do not conﬂict. The continuation payoﬀ function can specify the lowest possible continu-
ation when there is any deviation and the highest possible continuation when there is none.
With an opaque instrument, however, the continuation payoﬀ function can depend only
on a noisy signal of the policy, so these features do conﬂict. If the continuation payoﬀ function
speciﬁes the highest payoﬀ regardless of the observed noisy signal, then the payoﬀ has no
deterrence value and results in the one-shot equilibrium outcome. If this function builds in
any deterrence value by prescribing lower continuation values for some inﬂation rates, then
22with positive probability the lower continuation value must be realized even if the central bank
pursues the desired policy. This feature necessarily leads to lower payoﬀs along the equilibrium
path. In this sense, the advantage of transparency arises from the ability to precisely tailor the
continuation payoﬀ function to deviations: it can give high payoﬀs only when exactly the right
policy is being pursued, and it can give low payoﬀs when any other policy is used.
In the formal proof, we use the static Nash equilibrium in money growth rates. For that
equilibrium, we let (xN,μ N) be such that μN =a r gm a x μ R(xN,μ) and xN = μ. (For our model,
it is easy to show that xN =¯ y.)
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 . Let σ be equilibrium strategies in which the money regime is
chosen somewhere along the equilibrium path. Let t be the ﬁr s tp e r i o di nw h i c ham o n e y
regime is chosen. Let hgt be the history of central bank actions along the equilibrium path
before period t for the particular history, with agents’ wage xt,am o n e yg r o w t hr a t eμt(hgt),
and the continuation value wμt+1(π,ht).
Suppose ﬁr s tt h a tt h em o n e yg r o w t hr a t eμt(hgt) is strictly less than the static Nash
money growth rate μN. Then necessarily the continuation values wμt+1(π,hgt) must depend
nontrivially on π. (Otherwise, the central bank would deviate.) Let ¯ wt+1(hgt) and wt+1(hgt)
denote the highest and the lowest continuation values after ht under the equilibrium σ,s o
that ¯ wt+1(hgt)=m a x π wμt+1(π,hgt) and wt+1(hgt)=m i n π wμt+1(π,hgt),w h e r e ,b e c a u s et h e
continuation values depend nontrivially on π, ¯ wt+1(hgt) >w t+1(hgt).
We construct the better equilibrium ˜ σ–that is, one with higher welfare than σ–as follows.
In period t, after history hgt, let ˜ σ specify that the exchange rate regime is chosen, and let
t h ee x c h a n g er a t eb ec h o s e nt op r o d u c et h es a m em e a ni n ﬂation rate as under the original
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In the original equilibrium σ, the continuation values ¯ wt+1(hgt) and wt+1(hgt) were supported
by some particular strategies. In the equilibrium ˜ σ, let these continuation values be supported
by the same strategies. Let agents’ wage be ˜ xt(ht−1)=˜ et(hgt)=μt(hgt). For all other histories
not speciﬁed so far, let ˜ σ coincide with σ.
23Clearly, to show that our constructed strategies are an equilibrium, we need to show that
they satisfy the incentive constraint for the central bank after hgt w h e nt h ee x c h a n g er a t er e g i m e
is chosen. We also need to show that incentive constraints in prior periods are satisﬁed.
To see that the incentive constraint in period t is satisﬁed, note that in the original
equilibrium, the incentive constraint can be written as
(1 − β)[R(xt,μ
0
t) − R(xt,μ t(hgt))] ≤ β
Z
wμt+1(π,hgt)[f(π|μt(hgt)) − f(π|μt)]dπ, (23)
where xt = xt(ht−1). Note that because ¯ wt+1(hgt) and wt+1(hgt) are the upper and lower bounds
of the continuation value wμt+1(π,hgt), the right side of (23) satisﬁes
Z
wμt+1(π,hgt)[f(π|μt(hgt)) − f(π|μt)]dπ < ¯ wt+1(hgt) − wt+1(hgt). (24)
Next we show that the left side of (23) equals
(1 − β)[S(˜ xt(ht−1),e
0
t) − S(˜ xt(ht−1), ˜ et(hgt))]. (25)
This result holds because the two instruments are equally tight, the functions S and R coincide,
and, by construction, the inherited wages in the better equilibrium equal those in the original
equilibrium, ˜ xt(ht−1)=xt(ht−1). Combining (23)—(25) gives
(1 − β)[S(˜ xt(ht−1),e
0
t) − S(˜ xt(ht−1), ˜ et(hgt))] <β[¯ wt(hgt) − wt(hgt)]. (26)
Since (23) holds for any deviation μ0
t, (26) holds for any deviation e0
t.
Along the equilibrium path, the payoﬀs under our constructed strategies ˜ σ–the left side
of (21)–are strictly higher than those under σ–the left side of (20)–since
wet(˜ et(ht),h gt) =¯ wt(hgt) >
Z
wμt(π,hgt)f(π|μt(hgt)) dπ. (27)
Hence, at the history ht−1 under ˜ σ the central bank strictly prefers to adopt the exchange rate
regime, and welfare under ˜ σ is strictly greater than under σ.
To see that the incentive constraints are satisﬁed in periods before t, note that by our
deﬁnition of period t, in all prior periods the central bank’s equilibrium strategy speciﬁed an
exchange rate regime. Consider the incentive constraint in period t − 1 under the original
equilibrium σ:






t−1,w h e r eet−1 = et−1(hgt−1). By switching to ˜ σ, t h el e f ts i d eo f( 2 8 )i si n c r e a s e d
while the right side is unaﬀected because ˜ σ speciﬁe st h es a m ec o n t i n u a t i o na sσ following any
deviation. A similar argument applies to all preceding periods.
Now suppose that the money growth rate μt(hgt) is not less than but rather equal to the
static Nash money growth rate. Then, for any β>0, it is easy to show that an exchange rate
et strictly less than the μt(hgt) can be supported. This variation also improves welfare.
Therefore, ˜ σ is an equilibrium and, as we have shown, ˜ σ has higher welfare than σ.
So far we have shown that given any equilibrium in which the money growth rate is used
as an instrument in some period, there is an equilibrium in which the exchange rate is used
as an instrument in that same period which leads to higher welfare. To do so, we constructed
an alternative equilibrium in which we replaced a money regime by an exchange rate regime
in the ﬁrst period in which a money regime was chosen in the original equilibrium. Proceeding
recursively, it is clear that the best equilibrium must have an exchange rate regime in all periods.
Q.E.D.
III.C. Implications
Proposition 6 implies that without commitment, both tightness and transparency are
relevant for the optimal choice of a monetary policy instrument. In the best equilibrium without
commitment, if money and exchange rates have equal tightness, then exchange rates are strictly
preferred. By continuity, if money is a bit tighter than exchange rates, then exchange rates
are still strictly preferred. Of course, if money is suﬃciently tight, then it will be preferred to
exchange rates.
In proving our result, we have imposed no restrictions on strategies besides the natural
ones that arise from the environment. If we restrict strategies in the same way in both regimes,
say, to Markov strategies (as does Stokey [2003]) or to strategies that allow only reversion to
the one-shot equilibrium (as does Canzoneri [1985]), then we obtain similar results when we
compare the best equilibria within these restricted classes. The logic is identical to that for our
main result for an environment with no such restrictions.
In interpreting Proposition 6, note that we are ranking diﬀerent equilibria. The model
has many equilibria, and in any given one, the central bank is choosing its regime optimally,
taking as given the behavior of private agents. We have left unspeciﬁed the mechanism by
25which any particular equilibrium is implemented. Rather, we have simply shown that in the
best equilibrium, the more transparent instrument, the exchange rate, is chosen when both
instruments are equally tight. Only in this particular sense have we shown that exchange rates
have an advantage over money growth rates as a monetary policy instrument.
IV. Extensions
Thus far we have assumed that intended money growth is never observable. Here we
show that our results hold, with and without commitment, even when agents see other signals
of intended money growth or when they see intended money growth after a lag.
IV.A. AM o r eG e n e r a lS e t u p
Our setup with money and exchange rates is a special case of the following more general
setup. The central bank chooses a regime j ∈ {M,E} and an action ajt in regime j in period
t. Private agents see a signal sjt of this action
sjt = ajt + νjt, (29)
where νjt is an i.i.d. control error with variance σ2
νj. Inﬂation is determined according to
πt = sjt + ωjt, (30)
where ωjt is an i.i.d. linkage error with variance σ2
ωj that reﬂects the imperfect relationship
between the signal and the outcome. The setup we have been using above is a special case of
(29) and (30):
πt = ajt + νjt + ωjt.
In the money regime, the variance of the control error σ2
νM(= σ2
ε) is positive, but the
variance of the linkage error σ2
ωM is zero. In the exchange rate regime, the reverse is true: the
variance of the control error σ2




In the money regime, we think of the signal sMt as a monetary aggregate, say, M3, that
the public perfectly observes. This monetary aggregate is determined in part by the actions
26of the central bank aMt = μt and in part by an unobservable shock νMt. Inﬂation is, then,
perfectly determined by this monetary aggregate (πt = sMt).
I nt h ee x c h a n g er a t er e g i m e ,t h es i g n a lsEt coincides with the action aEt (= et). Inﬂation
is determined in part by the signal sEt and the shock to foreign inﬂation ωEt (= π∗
t). The public
perfectly observes the action of the central bank, but that action is only imperfectly related to
inﬂation.
IV.B. Multiple Monetary Aggregates
Our model can be extended to include multiple monetary aggregates with diﬀering levels
of tightness and transparency. To do so, we let
sjt = μjt + εjt
πt = sjt + νjt,
where sjt is the observed value of the monetary aggregate j (M0, M1, M2, etc.), μjt is the
intended value of the aggregate, εjt is the control error with variance σ2
εj,a n dνjt is a veloc-
ity shock with variance σ2
νj. Here the tightness of instrument j is σ2
εj + σ2
νj, and transparency
is measured by σ2
εj. With commitment, the tightest instrument is preferred. Without com-
mitment, the central bank trades oﬀ transparency and tightness in the same way it does in
our comparison of exchange rates and a single monetary aggregate. In this sense, the tight-
ness and transparency of the optimal monetary instrument vary with the environment and are
endogenous.
IV.C. Multiple Signals & An Observable Lag
In modeling the idea that exchange rates are easier to monitor than money growth rates,
we have made the simple but extreme assumptions that inﬂation is the only signal of the money
growth rate and that intended money growth rates are never observed. Here we show that we
can relax those assumptions–allow for multiple signals or for the money growth rate to be
observed with a lag–and still ﬁnd an advantage for transparency.
We begin with a second noisy signal of intended money growth. Here, similarly to our
earlier model,
st = at + νt, (31)
27where st is actual money growth, at is intended money growth, and νt is a control error. We
suppose now, however, that inﬂation is determined by intended money growth rather than
actual money growth, in that
πt = at + ωt, (32)
where ωt is the linkage error. Note that agents now have two signals of intended money growth:
st and πt.
Let f(π,s|a) be the density of inﬂation π and the noisy signal s given the intended money
growth rate a. Here the central bank’s continuation value can vary only with π and s and can









for any possible a0. Proving the analog of Proposition 6 in this environment is straightforward.
Now suppose that while inﬂation is the only signal of the money growth rate that agents
can observe in the current period, the intended money growth rate is perfectly observable with
al a g ;f o rs i m p l i c i t y ,a s s u m et h el a gi so n ep e r i o d .S p e c i ﬁcally, assume that the money growth
rate μt−1 is observed after agents set their wage in period t.
The intuition for why transparency is desirable in this environment is clear. Under the
money regime, any deviation in period t is not directly observed in that period. Thus, in period
t +1 , agents can react only to a noisy signal of that action. Of course, by period t +2 , agents
have observed the central bank’s period t action, and agents then can precisely react to any
d e v i a t i o ni np e r i o dt. This lag in the ability to react precisely leads to a tighter incentive
constraint under the money regime and thus gives the transparent exchange rate regime its
advantage.
The proof for the result that transparency has an advantage in this environment is similar
to that for Proposition 6, with the exception that if the central bank discounts the future
suﬃciently little, then the incentive constraint in both regimes is slack, and both regimes can
attain the Ramsey payoﬀ. When the incentive constraint in both regimes is slack, there is no
time inconsistency problem and, hence, no gain to transparency.
28V. Concluding Remarks
We have shown that the optimal choice of a monetary policy instrument depends on
how tight and transparent the optional instruments are and on whether policymakers can or
cannot commit to their future policies. Tightness is always desirable in an instrument, but
transparency is desirable only when policymakers cannot commit. Interest rates thus have a
natural advantage over money growth rates and exchange rates, because unlike those options,
interest rates can be made endogenously tight. And both interest rates and exchange rates
have a natural advantage over money growth rates because interest and exchange rates are
more transparent. The general implication of our analysis is that (when all else is equal) the
best monetary policy instrument is interest rates and the next-best is exchange rates. This
implication provides some insight into the observed monetary policy instrument choices of
developed and less-developed countries.
29Notes
1Canzoneri [1985] was the ﬁrst to use the logic of Green and Porter [1984] to explain
periodic bouts of high inﬂation. See also the work of Zarazaga [1995], who extends this logic,
and Albanesi, Chari, and Christiano [2001], who use multiple Markov equilibria to obtain similar
outcomes.
2A related literature uses signaling models to study the issue of transparency somewhat
diﬀerently. Herrendorf [1999] considers an environment with two types of monetary authority:
one with and one without a commitment technology. The monetary authority must choose
between a transparent ﬁxed exchange rate regime and an opaque ﬂoating exchange rate regime.
Herrendorf shows that if the public has suﬃciently strong beliefs that the monetary authority
can commit, then both types of monetary authority choose the ﬁxed exchange rate regime.
We think of Herrendorf’s model as applying to countries with governments that are likely to
have the power to commit and, hence, do not face signiﬁcant time inconsistency problems in
monetary policy. In contrast, we think of our model as applying to countries with governments
that have had chronic problems committing to good policies. Canavan and Tommasi [1997]
explore a theme similar to that of Herrendorf [1999] in a model with unobserved types that are
required to choose linear strategies. For related work in a domestic context, see the analysis of
Backus and Driﬃll [1985].
There is also some work in this literature on the issue of transparency in monetary
policy. Cukierman and Meltzer [1986] and Faust and Svensson [2001, 2002] explore linear
signaling outcomes in models with unobserved types.
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